The verifiable encrypted signature is one of the basic fair exchange protocols. There are important applications, such as e-commerce and other cryptographic protocols. We incorporate the verifiable encrypted signature into the certificate-based signature to propose an efficient certificate-based verifiable encrypted signature scheme in the paper, which does not require any bilinear pairing operations. Then we analyze the scheme's security under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. The analytic results show that our proposed scheme is proven secure, and our scheme simplifies the management of certificates and solves the problem of private key escrow. Compared with the other existing secure verifiable encrypted signature schemes, our certificate-based verifiable encrypted signature scheme provides greater efficiency and greatly reduces the cost of computation and communication, and achieves the same security level as other existing verifiable encrypted signature scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signature, which can prove authentication, integrity and non-repudiation, is one of the key techniques of information security. In recent years, various signature systems were proposed gradually, such as conventional Public Key Signature (PKS), Identity-based Public Key Signature (IB-PKS) [1] , Certificateless Public Key Signature (CL-PKS) [2] , and Certificate-based Public key Signature (CB-PKS) [3] , etc. In addition, a lot of methods and tools for digital signatures have been invented as patents in order to promote the application of signature. Such as Patent US 7502934, titled "Electronic signatures" [4] , is a method to the generation of digital signatures, Patent US 20080222418, titled "Signature Generation Device and Signature Verification Device" [5] , provided a signature generation apparatus capable of preventing transcript attack on signature data, and Patent US Application 20100174910, titled "Public Key Encryption with Digital Signature Scheme" [6] , is an improved encryption and digital signature system and method advantageously reduces byte size of the digital signature and reduction of costly computation overhead, and so on.
private and public key, and request a certificate from the Certificate Authority (CA), and the certificate is implicit and can be used as a part of the signing key. The CB-PKS schemes [13] [14] [15] inherit merits of IB-PKS and PKS. Simplifies the management of certificates in traditional PKS, solves the problem about private key escrow in IB-PKS and overcomes the problem of lower trust level in CL-PKS.
The verifiable encrypted signature (VES) is a special extension of ordinary signature primitive that was first proposed by Asokan et al. [16] , which can construct optimistic fair exchange protocol and there are useful for many cryptographic protocols. A VES involves three participants, namely a signer, a verifier and an adjudicator. The signer creates a VES by encrypting an ordinary signature with adjudicator's public key. Anyone can confirm that a VES is the encryption of an ordinary signature, but only the adjudicator can resume the ordinary signature from a VES. A secure VES should insure that the verifier obtains nothing except a valid VES. The adjudicator does not participate in the actual exchange protocol in normal cases, but is needed in case of dispute. The VES schemes are useful in fair exchange protocols [16, 17] and also in other cryptographic protocols [18] [19] [20] .
The early VES scheme is based on zero-knowledge proofs, and which is inefficient. In 2003, Boneh et al. first proposed a VES scheme with bilinear pairings in [21] , which is based on traditional PKC. Since then, several new constructions of VES scheme [22] [23] [24] [25] have been proposed including PKC-VES, ID-based VES and CL-VES, but there is still few Certificate-based Verifiable Encrypted Signature (CVES) scheme, and few VES scheme without pairings. The bulk of the VES scheme is constructed with bilinear pairings. On the other hand, the relative computation cost of the bilinear pairing operation is regarded as costly operations compared with other operations, such as scalar multiplication and exponentiation etc. Further, most of PKC-VES scheme are generally considered to be costly to use and managed, and ID-based VES scheme has an inherent drawback of key escrow, as the private key generator holds any user's private key, and the trust level of CL-VES is lower.
Recently, elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [26, 27] has received increasing attention from researchers' because of its high intensity security and efficient algorithm, and has been widely used in practical application in the information security, and a number of ECC relevant Patent were presented, including Patent US 7218735, titled "Cryptography Method on Elliptic Curves" [28] , is a cryptography method for generating probabilistic digital signatures etc., Patent US 8117447, titled "Authentication method employing elliptic curve cryptography" [29] , is an authentication method employing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and WIPO Patent Application WO/2010/146302, titled "Cryptography on an Elliptical Curve" [30] , is an electronic component in which a cryptographic calculation on an Elliptical Curve is performed.
In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure CVES scheme based on the elliptic curve group by incorporating the verifiable encrypted signature into the CB-PKS. Our scheme is provable secure under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over a finite field in the random oracles, and it does not require any pairing operations. In proposed CVES scheme, we set CA as an adjudicator to avoid a dishonest signer creating a CVES which can be verified but can not be resumed by the adjudicator using a replaced adjudicator's public key. Compared with the other existing secure VES scheme, our scheme enjoys less running time, operation cost and communication cost, as well as simple use and easy management, and thus have the merits of efficiency in performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the background concepts on elliptic curve group and some related mathematical problems which help realize our CVES scheme. Section 3 describes the formal definition of CVES. Section 4 proposes a new efficient CVES scheme without pairings. Section 5 gives a security proofs under the random oracle model, and Section 6 gives our analysis. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS
In this section, we would like to review some related mathematical problems [26, 27] . We can define the point addition and scalar multiplication as follows:
Elliptic
• The point addition: Let, , P Q G , l be a line containing P and Q, if Q P = , then l is a tangent line to q F E / , let R, be a third point of intersection with l and q F E / .
Then P + Q is the point such that
and , namely R P Q = + .
• The scalar multiplication: The scalar multiplication over
can be defined as follows:
......
Complexity Assumptions: Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), for The ECDLP defined over G is assumed to be intractable within polynomial time.
DEFINITION OF CVES

Formal Definition of CVES
There are three parties in a CVES scheme including a signer, a verifier and an adjudicator. We define a CVES as follows:
• Setup (k) The algorithm takes a security parameter k as its input and returns the system parameters params and the system master-key msk .
• In the formal definition described as above, the algorithms UserKeyGen, CertGen, Sign and Verify are the same as those of ordinary CB-PKS schemes.
Security Model
This section proposes a security model for CVES. We are concerned with three different types of attacks including signer's attack, verifier's attack and adjudicator's attack. We want our CVES scheme to be secure against each of these attacks.
As defined in ordinary CBS schemes, we should consider two types of adversary for a CVES scheme.
• Type I Adversary A I : The adversary A I simulates an uncertified user which holds the private key of the user and A I can substitute for any user's public key with his own values, but A I is not allowed to possess the system master-key. A I cannot obtain the certificate of the false public key from the certifier if he has replaced the user ID 's public key.
• Type II Adversary A II : The adversary A II simulates the malicious-but-passive CA which is allowed to possess the system master-key, but he is not able to substitute for any user's public key, and he doesn't know anything about the user's private key.
A secure CVES scheme required three security properties including validity, unforgeability and opacity.
• Validity: The validity of a CVES scheme can be verified by anyone, and the adjudicator can resume the valid ordinary CBS from a given CVES. Validity of a CVES scheme requires that the CBS which is generated by Sign algorithm must be able to pass the Verify algorithm, the CVES which is generated by CVES-Sign algorithm must be able to pass CVES-Verify algorithm, and the ordinary signature which is resumed from a given CVES by the adjudicator also must be able to be verified as an ordinary CBS. Namely, following equations should be satisfied. • Unforgeability: The unforgeability requires that it is hard to forge a valid CVES by a malicious adversary. • Opacity: The opacity requires that it is hard to extract an ordinary CBS from a given CVES by a malicious adversary. In our CVES scheme, because CA is an adjudicator, it is trusted not to break the opacity, so the opacity in our CVES secure model can be considered against adversary A I only. Adversary A I may request query oracles for UserKeyGen, Hash, Corruption, Public key replacement and Adjudication.
PROPOSED CVES SCHEME
We propose an efficient CVES scheme in this section. Our CVES scheme consists of the following eight algo-rithms, and we set CA as an adjudicator in our CVES scheme.
• 
Outputs an ordinary CB-PKS
• Verify: Given the system public parameters params , an ordinary CBS ) , ( U V = for the identity A ID on the message m , the verifier performs as follows:
• CVES-Sign Given the system parameters params , a message m , a signer's identity 
• CVES-Verify: Given the system parameters params , a 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Validity
Theorem 1. The proposed CVES scheme is valid.
Proof: We shall demonstrate the validity of our CVES scheme with three aspects as follows: Combining the above analysis, we can get that our CVES scheme meets the validity.
Unforgeability
Lemma 1. Our CVES scheme is existential unforgeable against the Type I adversary I A under the hardness of ECDLP in polynomial time.
Proof. We denote by I
A a type I Adversary who could attack our CVES scheme with non-negligible advantage, then, the adjudicator would successfully construct an algorithm B by interacting with the adversary I A to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Let, P be a generator of a multiplicative group G , whose order is a prime q.
Algorithm B is given a group element Q G . Its goal is to find
( 
PID PID =
, then B output "failure" and halts.
c c Q W W h h q s sU P = Thereby, B has successfully computed x as the solution of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Hence, we obtain the contradiction.
Theorem 2.
The proposed CVES scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks and the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
Proof. It is available from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 easily.
Opacity
Theorem 3. The proposed CVES scheme meets the opacity. 
Proof. Sets
ID Q V V h h x q P = Thereby, B has successfully computed x as the solution of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Hence, we obtain the contradiction, so the proposed CVES scheme meets the opacity.
Theorem 4.
The proposed CVES scheme is secure under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and the random oracle model.
Proof.
It is clear to conclude that our CVES scheme is secure under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and the random oracle model from the above theorem 1, theorem 2 and theorem 3.
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISION
We analyze and compare the performance of our CVES scheme with other existing VES schemes [22] [23] [24] [25] , and summarize the result in Table 1 as below. We denote P the pairing operation, M the scalar multiplication, E the modular exponentiation, SM the simultaneous scalar multiplication.
As shown in the above Table 1 , the existing VES scheme [22] [23] [24] all require pairing operations in the algorithm Sign, Verify, VES-Sign, VES-Verify and Adjudication, scheme [25] does not require any pairing operation in the algorithm Sign, VES-Sign and Adjudication, but both requires pairing operations in the algorithm Verify and VES-Verify, while our scheme does not require any pairing operation throughout the protocol. Therefore there are more advantages in our scheme with less running time and operation cost. In addition, the proposed VES scheme simplifies the certificate management process and solves the private key escrow problem. Thus, our scheme has high performance than the other existing VES schemes.
CONCLUSION
The paper proposes an efficient certificate-based verifiable encrypted signature scheme based on the elliptic curve group. The scheme does not have the key escrow problem and simplifies management process of the certificate, and does not use any bilinear pairing operations. Security analysis shows that it meets security properties including validity, opacity, and unforgeability under the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. The proposed CVES scheme, due to ability to have no pairings, is more efficient than the other previous VES schemes. 
